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ABSTRACT
Ethereum smart contracts are executable programs, deployed on a peer-to-peer network and exe-
cuted in a consensus-based fashion. Their bytecode is public, immutable and once deployed to the
blockchain, cannot be patched anymore. As smart contracts may hold Ether worth of several million
dollars, they are attractive targets for attackers and indeed some contracts have successfully been
exploited in the recent past, resulting in tremendous financial losses. The correctness of smart con-
tracts is thus of utmost importance. While first approaches on formal verification exist, they demand
users to be well-versed in formal methods which are alien to many developers and are only able to
analyze individual contracts, without considering their execution environment, i.e., calls to external
contracts, sequences of transaction, and values from the actual blockchain storage. In this paper,
we present Annotary, a concolic execution framework to analyze smart contracts for vulnerabilities,
supported by annotations which developers write directly in the Solidity source code. In contrast
to existing work, Annotary supports analysis of inter-transactional, inter-contract control flows and
combines symbolic execution of EVM bytecode with a resolution of concrete values from the public
Ethereum blockchain. While the analysis of Annotary tends to weight precision higher than sound-
ness, we analyze inter-transactional call chains to eliminate false positives from unreachable states
that traditional symbolic execution would not be able to handle. We present the annotation and anal-
ysis concepts of Annotary, explain its implementation on top of the Laser symbolic virtual machine,
and demonstrate its usage as a plugin for the Sublime Text editor.
1 Introduction
Smart contracts are small programs, executed by all verifying nodes of a blockchain as part of a consensus protocol.
The idea of smart contracts is to distribute not only data but also computation to a set of potentially untrusted peers,
in order to create distributed applications (”DApps”) that are not governed by a single party and operate correctly
and reliably, as long as the majority of the blockchain network sticks to the protocol. In that sense, smart contracts
implement the core business logic of DApps and are responsible for moving digital currency from one account (i.e.,
user) to another.
Ethereum, the most popular public implementation of the concept of smart contracts, is a permissionless public
blockchain that uses the above concepts to create a digital currency called Ether, as well as a general-purpose dis-
tributed computing engine with a quasi-Turing complete execution model. [12]. Ether is publicly tradable similar to
Bitcoin but also serves as the payment method for code execution of smart contracts in the Ethereum Virtual Machine
(EVM), typically written in the programming language Solidity [13] and compiled into the EVM bytecode format
which is then deployed to the peer-to-peer network.
In some applications, the amount of Ether controlled by a smart contract is enormous. From a security perspective,
smart contract code can thus be regarded similar to code of smart card applets: the code implements simple function-
ality in a well-defined and constrained environment and is thus easy to verify, but errors in that code are not tolerable
as extremely high values are at stake. At the same time, once deployed to the public, it is almost impossible to roll
ar
X
iv
:1
90
7.
03
86
8v
1 
 [c
s.C
R]
  8
 Ju
l 2
01
9
Annotary: A Concolic Execution System for Developing Secure Smart Contracts A PREPRINT
out security patches. Blockchains and DApps are created in a rapidly evolving industry where time-to-market is cru-
cial, and smart contract developers rarely have a background in writing highly critical code or experience with formal
verification methods. Various severe incidents have happened in the past, where vulnerabilities in smart contracts
allowed to lock in or withdraw significant amounts of Ether from popular DApps. To name only a few, this includes
the PoWHCoin bug, the first Parity bug (153,037 ETH stolen) [3], the second Parity bug (513,774.16 ETH frozen) [5],
and the DAO hack (3.6 mio. ETH stolen) [1] which finally lead to a hard fork of the Ethereum blockchain. These
incidents suggest that writing secure smart contracts is challenging and effectively supporting developers in avoiding
vulnerabilities is a necessity. Rigid formal verification methods have been proposed in the past [2] but later dismissed,
as they put too high demands on developers who are no experts in this field. Simple static analysis approaches, on the
other hand, help to avoid simple programming errors but are far from being precise enough to discover subtle flaws –
especially those manifesting in the interaction between multiple contracts.
In this paper, we introduce Annotary, a concolic execution tool that supports Solidity developers in writing error-
free smart contracts. In contrast to other tools which focus on searching predefined vulnerability patterns, we take a
developer-centric perspective and allow developers to express their expectations in the form of annotations directly in
the Solidity code. Annotary then conducts a concolic execution analysis of the compiled EVM bytecode against these
annotations and informs the developer about potential violations – currently in the form of a plugin for the Sublime
editor. We advance the state of the art in EVM analysis by including interactions between contracts and along chains
of transactions in the analysis and make the following contributions
1. extend concolic analysis of EVM bytecode to properly span contract interactions and sequences of transac-
tions.
2. a backward-compatible extension of the Solidity language by annotations which allows developers to state
verifiable properties
3. a proof-of-concept implementation of Annotary, including a Sublime Text plugin
2 Background
Although at a syntactical level, Solidity resembles C or JavaScript, its execution model has some peculiarities that
require further discussion. Furthermore, we will provide some background on Mythril, a vulnerability scanning tool
for Ethereum smart contracts, that we significantly extended in the process of developing Annotary.
2.1 Solidity and Smart Contracts
Solidity is a high-level language for implementing smart contracts and targets the Ethereum Virtual Machine (EVM)
platform. It is statically typed, supports multiple inheritance, libraries, complex user-defined types, contracts as mem-
bers, overloading and overwriting, abstraction and interfaces, as well as encapsulation through visibility modifiers.
Solidity’s contract-orientation appears similar to object-oriented languages, using the contract keyword instead of
class. However, in contrast, to truly object-oriented languages, such type definitions do not end up in the actual
bytecode which consequently only includes instantiations of contracts and their respective functions [13]. A special
contract-creation transaction is used to invoke the ”constructor” and as a result, the contract is instantiated and assigned
a public address which only holds the code that can be called by transactions. It is also important to note that contracts
created from the same code basis do not share any data or (static) functions.
Listing 1 illustrates some typical concepts of the Solidity language, including inheritance and two different ways
to declare constructors. The constructor in 2 is declared by naming the function equal to its contract (analog to
languages like Java), while 3 uses the newer constructor keyword (analog to JavaScript, albeit Solidity merely
treats constructor as a function modifier), which became mandatory in version 5.0 [7] of Solidity to avoid vulner-
abilities related to simply misspelling function names. The example also shows two patterns which are common in
smart contracts: first, the constructor keeps track of the owner who originally deployed the contract by assigning the
associated 20-byte address 1 passed to the constructor to the owner field. This allows the contract to later distin-
guish between calls that are made by its original owner or by anyone else. Second, the contracts defines a nameless
default function 4 that is called when callers invoke the contract without referring to a specific function. In this
case, the require-statement will roll back the transaction if the sender attempts to send any Ether (msg.value) to a
non-existing function. To address a specific function in a transaction, it must include the function identifier, which is
computed as the first four most significant bytes of the keccak256 hash of the function signature.
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1 contract A {
2 address owner;
3 function A(){ owner = msg.sender; 1 } 2
4 }
5 contract B is A{
6 uint variable;
7 function constructor (){ variable = 1;} 3
8 function setVar(uint var1){ ... }
9 function () payable { require(msg.value == 0);} 4
10 }
Listing 1: Solidity smart contract example
Entities and Interactions Ethereum is a distributed system building a singleton computer with accounts as entities
and transactions referring to accounts as the smallest units of computation. Accounts are identified by a 160-bit
address, have a balance of Ether, a transaction counter, and two possibly empty fields: the associated bytecode and
storage state. Wallets are contracts with empty bytecode and their 160-bit address is the hash of their public key. The
holder of the private key signs transactions proving its origin to be the Wallet. Transactions to these accounts can only
transfer Ether. Accounts with associated bytecode are contract accounts and receive their address in a deterministic
process when a contract creation transaction is sent to the network. The construction-bytecode is run, and the resulting
state of the contract is some possibly non-empty storage state and the runtime-bytecode.
Transactions are signed data packets that represent a message to an account by specifying its address in the to-field
or a contract-creation transaction if the content is 0. Messages can be the result of a transaction or of subsequent
deterministic calls between contracts when bytecode is executed. They are unsigned blocks of data sent from one
account to another still associated with the verified initial sender of the transaction. If an account with non-empty
bytecode receives a message, an instance of the EVM is started with the target account’s bytecode and the message
data as input. Returned data is passed to the calling EVM context or returned as transaction result.
2.2 EVM and Bytecode
EVM has a simple stack-based architecture with a word size of 256 bit that allows to directly map keccak-256 hashes
to addresses. A predefined finite resource called gas must be assigned to each transaction and serves as the unit for
computational effort that is consumed by each EVM instruction. It thus helps to prevent Denial-of-Service (DoS)
attacks by stopping the execution when it is depleted, making the EVM a quasi-Turing-complete machine that has a
Turing-complete instruction set but can only execute a limited number of statements [24]. The simplicity of the EVM
bytecode with its 70 main instructions made the EVM a popular target for formal verification projects [15, 22, 10].
During execution the EVM maintains three main types of memory that are also relevant for the analysis by Annotary:
The world state σ is a mapping from 160-bit addresses a to account states and is kept in a Merkle Patricia tree
that represents the result of executing all transactions saved on the Ethereum blockchain. A mapped account state
σ[a] contains the balance σ[a]b in Wei, the smallest sub-unit of Ether (1018 Wei = 1 Ether), the storage σ[a]s
as mapping from 256-bit integer values to 256-bit integer values σ[a]s : 2256 → 2256, and the immutable runtime
bytecode σ[a]c of an account that is executed in the case of message receipt.
The execution environment I contains data that is fixed during message processing, including the address of the
current message recipient Ia whose code is executed, and the sender of the message Is. Io is the account associated
with the original transaction and may differ from Is for inter-contract messages. Id contains the input data for the
current execution, such as function parameters. Iv contains the value of Ether in Wei transfered from the sender Is to
the recipient Ia. Ib contains the runtime bytecode of Ia that is executed and IH stores the header of the block that
the current transaction will be mined in.
The machine state µ contains the variable and volatile part of the computation held only during message processing.
These include the volatile operand LIFO stack µs with 256-bit words and a byte-addressable heap memory µm used
for more complicated computation or larger chunks of data. It further holds the program counter µpc and the output
byte-array µo of the execution. Changes of the execution are not persisted if not send or returned to a different account
or stored in σ[a].
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2.3 Mythril and the LASER-SVM
Mythril [20] is an open-source security analysis tool for Ethereum smart contracts and serves as the foundation for
Annotary1
It uses LASER-SVM, an internal symbolic virtual machine, to explore smart contract bytecode in a depth-first search
fashion over the control flow graph (CFG). For this, it operates on a representation of σ, I and µ. Values that are
unknown during execution are represented as symbolic variables, and the explored execution paths are transformed
into path conditions, i.e., constraint systems over the symbolic variables along the respective execution path. Mythril
runs vulnerability detection modules that inspect the explored executions states for known vulnerability patterns and
attempts to compute concrete input values leading to the execution of the vulnerability by solving the respective
constraint system using the Z3 SMT solver [19]. As the EVM uses 256-bit operands for computation, Mythril uses a
bit-vector algebra at a fixed size of 256 bits to model arithmetic operations and boolean algebra. While Mythril and
especially its LASER-SVM provide a good basis of concolic/symbolic execution for EVM bytecode, Mythril’s goal
is not to allow analysis of specifiable properties. Mythril lacks the following capabilities which Annotary aims to
provide:
• The ability to let developers specify invariants and assertions in the contract and the ability to verify them
before the potentially vulnerable contract is irrevocably deployed.
• A model of EVM instructions and execution semantics for inter-contract- and inter-transactional control
flows.
• Reachability analysis of transaction sequences to reduce false positives.
• Symbolic execution of contract constructors with parameters.
3 Annotation Driven Concolic Analysis
Rather than exploitation, Annotary aims at secure development while expanding the analysis scope to inter-contract
and inter-transactional analyses. We begin this section by outlining the overall system and then detailing the main
aspects of the analysis. Figure 1 shows how Annotary’s editor plugin passes source and configuration files to the
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Figure 1: Annotary’s architecture with Solidity files undergoing analysis and violations reported to the editor plugin.
analysis component and receives found annotation violations for visualization.
3.1 Annotations
Annotary specifies a set of annotations which developers can use to express invariants and restrictions directly in the
Solidity source code. These annotations will then be translated into constraints or injected as asserts and analyzed
to become part of the constraint system for an execution path. As annotations may include expressions, as well as
references to Solidity functions and members, they require a separate compilation pass in addition to compilation
of the actual source code. This is done by the annotation processor which takes annotations as input and translates
them into EVM instructions by rewriting the original contract code. The purpose of the so added instructions is
1As Mythril is under active development, this paper refers to the commit hash github.com/ConsenSys/mythril-classic/commit/
b5afa9ff1aa2b5dc8863d29aa9e0a24b34eb4747 of the project
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only to create additional constraints. To not alter the semantics such as state or control flow of the actual contract
the execution of inserted code is isolated from the rest. When the symbolic execution reaches a state that violates
any constraint derived from an annotation, the contract is considered to violate the developer’s expectations, and the
violation is reported to the developer. Annotary implements three types of annotations:
1. Inline checks: The annotation "@check("BoolExpr")" and its negation
"@never("BoolExpr")" specify properties inside a contract function that are checks whether or not the spec-
ified condition holds. The condition can hold any boolean expression valid in solidity including calls to other
functions and contracts.
2. Contract invariants: The annotation "@invariant("BoolExpr")" defines a contract wide condition that has
to hold whenever a transaction persists its state.
3. Set restrictions: restricts writing to a member variable from outside of explicitly allowed functions. A state
at a SSTORE instruction is reported a violation if the SSTORE writes to the protected variable and the function
is not explicitly allowed to. Users can specify these restrictions with the following annotation:
"@set_restricted("["var="{[ContractName "."] MemberName[","]} ";"]}
↪→ ["func="]{"constructor"|FunctionName|FunctionSignature}")"
3.2 Modeling Transaction Execution
Depending on the type of data, Annotary uses different strategies to treat memory locations either as concrete or as
symbolic values. Concrete values will be initialized according to the EVM’s actual behavior, i.e., storage on contract
creation will be initialized by 0. Symbolic values refer to variables of the SMT constraint system which refer to
specific memory locations. For instance, we write σ[Ia]s[key] → BitV ecRef(storage[key], 256) to denote the
allocation of a variable key in storage. In general, when writing data to some memory location, Annotary supports
both concrete and symbolic values and propagates data of the respective type to the memory location. When data is
read from a previously unused location, however, it depends on the data type whether Annotary will treat it as symbolic
or concrete:
Call data is modeled symbolically to represent all possible user interactions with the contract. Memory is treated
concretely and reinitialized with the default value 0 for constructor and transaction execution. The creation code
itself is known, but the appended initialization parameters are unknown at analysis time and thus handled symbolically.
Reads after the end of the known instructions default to return symbolic variables.
Storage is set to the concrete type when the constructor is executed. On this first transaction, the content of storage is
known and defaults to returning 0 when reading from unwritten locations.
Then, storage is reset to be empty and treated symbolically henceforth to represent the most generic state space and
account for all unknown transactions that might have happened between construction and invocation of the smart
contract.
3.3 Inter-contract Analysis
Annotary can correctly handle dependencies between contracts, including those which manifest only at Solidity but
not at bytecode level.
Contract inheritance: is the only relation that is not directly visible in bytecode and requires Annotary to pre-
and post-processes Solidity code. It uses the C3-linearization of the inheritance hierarchy to identify transaction
implementations defined by a parent contract that are callable once the child contract is deployed. Asserts referencing
member variables of a child contract cannot be directly injected into the transaction function of the parent contract, as
the member variable is not in the parent’s scope. To solve this, Annotary generates a proxy function with the same
signature in the child contract that delegates the call through the super keyword and injects the assert.
Nested contract creation: Contracts can create other contracts by piggybacking the necessary constructor bytecode
in their runtime bytecode. Annotary spawns a new symbolic execution with the creation bytecode extracted from the
current transaction execution.
Inter-contract interactions: happen when the analyzed contract performs a message call or executes foreign contract
code on their storage. Symbolically executing these interactions allows to resolve potentially returned values and
to understand changes on the analyzed contracts state. Annotary implements symbolic execution for several EVM
instructions for inter-contract interaction, lacking by Mythril, including CREATE, STATICCALL, RETURNDATACOPY,
RETURNDATASIZE, and EXTCODECOPY. All instructions that trigger inter-contract interactions are executed with the
appropriate concrete or symbolic persisting data type:
CALLCODE and DELEGATECALL execute external contract code referenced by the address of the external contract in
5
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the context of the current contract and can, therefore, change the contracts persistent storage. If address and code can
be resolved, symbolic execution can account for these calls effects. If they cannot be resolved, storage has to be reset
to be empty and symbolic, and the variables in the constraints are renamed to avoid collisions.
CALL and STATICCALL are executed with empty symbolic storage for the first interaction and with the initialized
symbolic storage on further interactions.
CREATE deploys a new contract and executes the contract creation with empty concrete storage that is used for further
interactions with the contract in the same transaction. In other transactions executions storage will be considered
empty and symbolic.
3.4 Inter-transactional Analysis
Annotary implements inter-transactional reachability analysis to eliminate false positive violations that are not reach-
able considering the possible set of contract transactions.
3.4.1 Extracting Transaction Traces
Annotary uses transaction traces τ = {∆,Φ} for inter-transactional analysis, information of a contract execution that
persists after the execution is finished:
• ∆ is a mapping of symbolic state variables k in σ[Ia], e.g., storage slots or balance, of the currently analyzed
contract to SMT bit vector expressions δ, representing the change that a transaction performs on the state.
• The trace constraints Φ are a set of conditions that have to hold such that the transaction represented by τ
can be executed on the contract. Φ is a subset of the path constraints. Path constraints with no reference to
the previous state, e.g., only to input data, are not included in Φ and do not lower the accuracy of reachability
analysis.
Traces should represent state changing transactions that can appear amid a transaction sequence. The global states
at the persisting instructions STOP and RETURN, are taken into consideration, while states at SELFDESTRUCT cannot
be followed by further transactions and are therefore ignored. States with unchanged persisted values, e.g., in storage
and balance, are filtered out due to irrelevance for the sequence and states with unsatisfiable path constraints due to
inapplicability. ∆ and Φ are extracted from global states that represent the unmodified contract execution, reducing
constraints by all that are not relevant in an inter-transactional analysis.
Annotary differentiates between constructor transaction traces (τc) and message transaction traces (τm) and brings
states that may violate an annotation into a transaction trace representation (τv) to allow reachability analysis.
3.4.2 Chain Transaction Traces
Annotary combines traces through expression substitution to explore the possible persisted states of a contract instead
of iterative concolic execution. τ12 := τ1 ◦ τ2 represents the symbolic trace left onto the contract state when τ1 is
executed before τ2. Definition 1 shows how traces are combined. The changes to the contract state ∆1 that trace τ1
applied exist at the beginning of trace τ2. Therefore the changes ∆1 have to be applied to the expressions used in ∆2
and Φ2.
τ1 := {∆1,Φ1} τ2 := {∆2,Φ2}
τ12 := {∆12 := ∆1 ◦∆ ∆2, Φ12 := Φ1 ∪ (∆1 ◦Φ Φ2)} (1)
◦Φ in Definition 2 and ◦∆ in Definition 3 are necessary operations to apply the storage changes ∆1 to τ2. Φ is a list
and ∆ is a mapping of expressions. The pairs (k′, δ′) in the mapping ∆ can be used together with the SMT-solvers
substitute function to replace appearance of a value k′ in an expression e with δ′.
∆ ◦Φ Φ := [substitute(∆, φ) : φ ∈ Φ] (2)
∆1 ◦∆ ∆2 := [(k, substitute(∆1, δ)) : (k, δ) ∈ ∆2] (3)
We further define two properties for traces, spanning one or more transactions: A trace τ is valid if its constraints are
satisfiable. An invalid trace means that the constraints are not satisfiable and thus this sequence of instructions and
calls among transactions is not executable at runtime. In the following, we denote satisfiability of a trace as sat(τ).
A trace can further be state independent if its constraints do not contain any symbolic variables k referencing the
previous contract state. State independence means that execution of that trace does not depend on the prior execution
of any other contracts and is denoted by svar(τ) = ∅.
6
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3.4.3 Confidence Levels
By combining the properties of validity and state independence, Annotary expresses the confidence with which found
violations will exist at runtime. Annotary supports the following confidence levels, from most to least confident:
1. Single transaction violation: For the intra-transactionally verified violating trace τv , sat(τv)∧svar(τv) = ∅
holds. In this case, the transaction violates the annotation.
2. Chained transaction violation: For a valid and state independent trace τm∗v of optionaly many applications2
of transactions from τm and finally τv (i.e., sat(τm∗v) ∧ svar(τm∗v) = ∅ holds). In this case, the annotation
is violated, independent from which contract state the call is made.
3. Constructed violation: A sequence of traces starting from the constructor was found that can trigger the
annotation violation and is sat(τcm∗v)∧ svar(τcm∗v) = ∅. The attacker requires to be the contract creator or
find a contract in the required state.
4. Unconfirmed violation: The chaining depth d was reached and there is at least one τmdv that is sat(τmdv)∧
svar(τmdv) 6= ∅.
5. Violation avoiding context: A point in the analysis was reached where the possibilities of chaining trans-
actions to reach the violating state was exhausted. This means that although sat(τv) ∧ svar(τv) 6= ∅ it is
also such that ∃c ∈ N : c <= d : (@τmcv ∈ T : sat(τmcv)) ∧ ∀e ∈ N : e <= c : @τmev ∈ T :
sat(τmev) ∧ svar(mev) = ∅.
6. Unsatisfiable violation: The violating transaction τv is not satisfiable. This means
!sat(execution constraintsτv ).
3.4.4 Chaining Strategy
To check the validity of a found violation two high level strategies can be used to explore transaction traces:
Forward: Starting from the set of constructor and transaction traces Tc ∪ Tm, the current trace chains are applied to
Tv ∪ Tm, and the new trace chain is checked for satisfiability. If the chain is satisfiable, the violation is confirmed.
Backward: Starting from the violating traces τv ∈ Tv , the set of contract traces Tc ∪ Tm are applied to the set of
remaining transaction chains. If an explored trace chain is valid and state independent, the violation is confirmed. If
the form of the sequence is τcm∗v the exploration attempts to find a more threatening sequence τm∗v . Annotary uses
τv1 τv2
... τm2 ◦ τv1 τm1 ◦ τv2 ...
τm1 ◦ τm2 ◦ τv1 ... τc1 ◦ τm1 ◦ τv2 ...
Figure 2: Backward strategy finding state independent sequence for both violations.
this strategy depicted in Figure 2 as it allows to differentiate between violations with confidence level unconfirmed
violation and violation avoiding context. The size of initial traces is smaller if |Tc ∪ Tm| > |Tv|. Trace chaining
scales better if |Tc ∪ Tm| < |Tv ∪ Tm| ⇐⇒ |Tc| < |Tv|.
4 Implementing Annotary
This section elaborates on the implementation of the Annotary, i.e., a Sublime Text plugin and the inter-contract
concolic analysis on top Mythrils Laser-SVM.
4.1 Preprocessing of Solidity Contracts
In a first preprocessing step, Annotary parses Solidity source files and extracts the annotations stating the conditions
that will be analyzed. The input files are then parsed with the solidity compiler solc to gain the construction (bin)
and runtime binaries (bin-runtime) of the contracts, the source code mappings (srcmap), that link the symbolically
executed instructions to the code segments they were compiled from, the contracts application binary interface (ABI),
which describes the transactions that can be executed and the expected input parameters, and finally the contract’s
2shorthand notation: τa ◦ τb := τab, application of d arbitrary set members τmd := τm1 ◦ ... ◦ τmd
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abstract syntax tree (AST) to identify transaction endpoints, retrieve inheritance structures, functions and member
variables.
Annotary adds a rewriting pass to the compilation process that converts @check and @invariant annotations into
corresponding sets of assert statements, as in Appendix A.2. Furthermore, Annotary modifies the LASER-SVM to
isolate the execution of rewritten code from affecting the rest of the symbolic execution. We extended the LASER-
SVM by a state processor that keeps track of instructions, result of the rewrite pass, excluding the resulting states from
the set of unmodified contract states.
4.2 Concolic Execution
Annotary builds upon the LASER-SVM to extend inter-contract and adds inter-transactional analysis. We now guide
the reader through the most significant building blocks that Annotary adds to LASER-SVM.
4.2.1 Symbolic Handling of Inter-contract Calls
Annotary extends LASER-SVM by adding handlers for instructions that were not supported, in order to close the se-
mantic gap between LASER-SVM and EVM. The CREATE instruction is implemented by executing a contract creation
transaction with the nested contract code extracted from the current contract. The prior transaction execution is re-
sumed with the newly created contract in σ. Support for the STATICCALL instruction is added, analog to the CALL
instruction with msg.value set to 0, as no funds are transferred, and a flag that prevents SSTORE-instruction in nested
calls to write persistent storage. RETURNDATASIZE and RETURNDATACOPY are implemented by extracting size and
data from the global state and copying them to stack and memory, respectively. If Annotary successfully resolves the
concrete address that is given to EXTCODECOPY, the retrieved external code is copied to memory and treated concretely.
4.2.2 Pre-, and Post-processing and Filtering of States
Annotary modifies how the LASER-SVM processes instructions in its worklist to handle instructions differently that
have been added to the unmodified contract code.
For instance, the ASSERT FAIL instruction, would immediately terminate the execution when a given condition is not
fulfilled. If that instruction has been inserted into the bytecode as a consequence of an @check annotation, however,
we need a different semantic, as we want to detect the violation of the annotation, but not necessarily terminate the
symbolic execution at that state. We thus extend LASER-SVM by state labels that mark individual states in the explored
symbolic state space as Violating and/or Ignore to indicate that this state was the result of code modification to identify
violations and shall be saved and/or isolated from the set of states representing the execution of the unmodified code.
4.3 Violation Identification and Classification
After the concolic execution, Annotary has access to the state space of the unmodified contract and a set of states
violating the @check or @invariant annotations. We can map these directly to warnings that will be displayed to the
developer at the corresponding line of code. The @set restricted annotation limits write operations to a member
variable to a set of valid functions and thus needs to search for violating states at SSTORE instructions. The writing
function is identified over the instruction association to code and the saved path constraint that stems from the selected
function identifier. The written Solidity member is identified through the storage index according to the computed
outline in storage, which requires Annotary to keep track of relevant keccak256 results, depicted in Appendix A.3.
Annotary searches through the state space for a path that starts at a violating location and ends in a state at a STOP or
RETURN that would effectively persist the violating transaction to storage.
4.3.1 Chaining Transactions
Annotary chains transactions by merging selected states from the symbolic state space of one transaction into the
state space of the previous transaction. The selection includes only relevant states, i.e. only those which have inter-
transactional effects (e.g., write to storage).
When creating execution traces of transaction sequences, Annotary maintains meta-data that is assigned to the se-
quence and presents users more qualified information such as the transaction depth and the sequence of contract
functions, as well as data to optimize the trace chaining operation, such as the set of symbolic state variables that
references prior contract states and the set of transaction variables. Both sets allow to keep track of variables that
have to be substituted or renamed when combining transactions and allows for an efficient implementation using the
Z3 expression substitution functionality. However, chaining transactions will lead to an explosion of possible chains
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and thus explored states, limiting the depth of transaction sequences that can be analyzed. We illustrate this effect with
real-world contracts in Section 5.
Annotary analyzes transactions preceeding a violating trace for two purposes. A valid chain confirms the inter-
transactional validity of the violation and the resulting confidence level gives a more nuanced judgment of the violation.
Algorithm 4 in Subsection A.3 shows how the sequence of preceeding transactions with the highest confidence level
that leads to a given violation is found. When the violating transaction sequence contains no symbolic state variables
in the constraint expressions, a state independent chain of length one is found, it is assigned the confidence level single
transaction violation. At every iteration step, all traces in τc ∪ τm are applied to the violating sequences of depth
n − 1, which in the beginning is only the violating trace. Traces are only applied to a sequence if they overwrite
a symbolic state variable and the set of constraints are checked for satisfiability before they are added to the set of
violating sequences of length n. If a transaction sequence ends in a constructor trace τc, the chain is saved with the
confidence level Constructed violation but the search for a more severe violating sequence is continued. If the trace is
from the set τm and chained trace is state independent, the search is terminated with a sequence of confidence Chained
transaction violation. If the set of new sequences is empty because all trace applications resulted in sequences with
unsatisfiable constraints, the initial violation gets the confidence level Violation avoiding context. If the maximal depth
is reached the violating trace is of confidence level Unconfirmed violation. After all violations are categorized, the
annotation’s violation confidence level is set to the highest level of the found sequences. Finally, all annotations with
their violations are returned in JSON-format to the Sublime Text plugin.
4.4 Annotary Plugin
The Annotary plugin bridges the gap to concolic execution from within the Sublime Text editor. Annotations are
written inside of Solidity files, and a context menu allows to run the search for violations. Annotations and violating
code pieces are visualized inside of the documents, e.g., in Figure 3 in Subsection A.1. Hovering over them shows the
confidence level, the violating transactions, and informative description. A config allows disabling trace chaining, set
the depth of chained traces and followed jumps during concolic execution.
5 Discussion
We evaluated Annotary with respect to its effectiveness and efficiency. First, we assessed how Annotary performs with
vulnerable contracts and if it would detect all vulnerabilities as expected. We thus created a sample set of 11 small
contracts with known programming mistakes that have led to severe vulnerabilities in the past and added annotations
that would have made Annotary detect the flaw. Among others, this set includes the following mistakes: one of the
Parity bugs [5] allowed execution of an initialization function because of the unset member variable initialized.
By adding an @invariant(initialized==true) annotation, Annotary was able to spot this vulnerability. This
mistake is especially hard to spot for humans if non-obvious call paths over library functions allow the execution of
the initialization function [3] or if typos such as state =+ 1 (which evaluates to state = 1) instead of state += 1
are present. A further included mistake is to erroneously expose functions that allow writing to some member variable
by incorrectly setting (or omitting) one of Solidity’s four visibility modifiers for functions. Annotary catches this
error, if the member variable is annotated with @set restricted. Another, especially subtle mistake is writing to
uninitialized structs. Structs can be persisted in either memory or storage and if declared in ”C style” and not marked
otherwise, default to storage. If fields of a struct are written without prior initialization, the write operation will
overwrite the first storage slots, which can lead to disastrous consequences. Consider this snippet, which overwrites
the owner address by calling doSth().
1 c o n t r a c t t e s t {
2 s t r u c t MyStruc t { u i n t myFie ld ; }
3 address owner ; // Keeps track of privileged owner
4
5 f u n c t i o n doSth ( ) {
6 MyStruc t s ;
7 s . myFie ld = u i n t ( msg . sender ) ; // Overwrites owner
8 } }
Annotary detects this vulnerability, if owner is annotated with @set restricted (cf. Figure 3), even taking delegated
calls into account.Annotary detects all programming mistakes in the ”small’ sample set. Table 2 lists the mistakes and
used annotation types.
In a second step, we were interested in the performance of Annotary with real-world contracts and created a second
sample set of 24 large contracts with the highest balance of Ether and available source code in the public Ethereum
network. These contracts were not annotated and are not known to contain vulnerabilities, it is therefore not possible
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to create data underpinning the soundness and completeness of Annotary. Nevertheless, we evaluated the coverage
of the symbolic execution, the runtime, and scalability with respect to the depth of chained execution traces to give
an impression on Annotary’s runtime. As can be seen from Table 1, the coverage of the ”large” sample set is 80%,
while the coverage of the small set is 88%. The average runtime for the ”small” set is 4 seconds, which we consider
well-suited for IDE integration, especially when considering that no performance optimizations have been done so far.
For the real-world contracts from the ”large” sets, the average runtime is with 700 seconds significantly higher due
to larger code sizes. Columns d<n> in Table 1 illustrate how increasing the depth of the analyzed call chains adds
significant runtime overhead. A feasible mode of operation might thus be to configure the depth of analysis in the IDE
to be lower and to run a full analysis in a CI server.
Table 1: Average runtime of Annotary’s analysis of the ”small” and ”large” sample
Type Sample size Coverage[%] Sym. Exe.[s] d1[s] d2[s] d3[s] d4[s] d5[s] d6[s]
Small 11 88 1.3 0.07 0.13 0.34 0.82 1.9 4.1
Large 24 80 54.2 12.9 17.8 606 - - -
6 Related Work
Symbolic execution approaches with the pioneer Oyente [18] by Luu et al., the extension Osiris [23] by Torres et
al., and Mythril [20] by Bernhard Mueller et al. use the results of symbolic execution and SMT-solving to find
known vulnerabilities in an intra-transactional context. MAIAN [21] by Nikolic et al. extends this approach to an
inter-transactional context and finds vulnerability patterns defined over multiple transactions. Annotary builds upon
Mythril’s LASER-SVM and extends it to support inter-contract analysis. Our work further differs from the aforemen-
tioned tools in that it supports inter-transactional executions chains. To the best of our knowledge, Teether [17] by
Krupp and Rossow is the only publication that also considers transaction traces. However, Teether does not allow
customizable checking of properties but rather searches already deployed contract for a single vulnerability pattern.
Our contribution is thus the first customizable development framework for smart contract developers, supporting inter-
contract and inter-transactional analyses. Further work related to our is Zeus [16] by Kalra et al., which translates
Solidity into LLVM and performs model checking against policies. Vandal [11] by Brent et al. converts EVM byte-
code to abstract semantic logic relations and analyzes logic constraints over them. Formal verification in the form of
Why3 [14] was already integrated into the Solidity online IDE Remix, requiring developers to create semi-assisted
proofs, but the support was later removed [6]. Other attempts include the formalization of contracts and EVM in
F* [10] by Bargavan et al. and in the formal verification framework Lem [4], that do not precisely capture inter-
contract analysis and do not support inter-transactional analysis. Ahrendt et al. propose to translate Solidity into Java
to make use of KeY, a well-approved theorem proving framework for Java programs [9]. Hildenbrandt et al. introduced
the KEVM [15], an executable formal specification of the EVM in theK framework which provides inter-contract and
inter-transactional provability of claims by formulating all-path reachability statements. All these approaches require
users to formulate desired properties in a formal language understood by the verifier, e.g., K’s XML-style language or
Why3’s WhyML.
7 Conclusions
The field of secure development of smart contracts is still in its infancy and some of its challenges are fundamentally
different from traditional software development due to the distributed computation model and the immutability of
code. We contribute Annotary to this field, an approach that strikes a balance between rigid but hard-to-use formal
methods and static source code analyzers which have no knowledge of intent, thus producing too many false positives.
Our three main conclusions from this work are that first, annotations are a feasible way for developers to express
their expectations and check their contracts for correctness in a language and environment they are comfortable with.
Earlier work on integrating formal verification methods into Solidity has been dismissed for that reason, while the
SMT-checking based approach that also Annotary adopts seems to be well received by the community (cf. [20, 8]).
Second, inter-contract and inter-transactional analysis are required to make sound statements about the security of a
contract. Analysis of a single contract captures only a fraction of an actual Ethereum transaction and will not be able
to create sound statements about safety and security guarantees. Third, the use of concrete values helps to increase
precision and at the same time limit the complexity of the analysis. In contrast to traditional programs, where the
specific execution environment is not known at the time of analysis, we can resolve concrete addresses referring to the
Ethereum network and retrieve actual values from there.
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The different confidence levels of Annotary allow for a more nuanced interpretation of findings by the developer,
as opposed to traditional source code analyzers which rank all findings equally relevant. As part of our prototype
evaluation, we have shown how Annotary detects common programming pitfalls and is able to detect cross-transaction
vulnerabilities. The runtime analysis suggests its applicability in an IDE for smaller contracts and acceptable runtimes
for larger contracts when integrated into continuous integration (CI) processes.
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A Appendix
A.1 Annotary IDE Plugin
Figure 3: Annotary marks violated annotations and violating code.
A.2 Code Rewritings
Inline Checks at annotation position: @check(condition) −→ assert(condition);
Asserting Invariants - at empty block end: ∅ −→ assert(condition);.
- before empty return statement: return; −→ assert(condition); return;.
- before return with value: return (exp1, ...); −→ var (v <nonce1>,...) = (exp1, ...;
assert(condition); return (v <nonce1>, ...);.
Proxy Asserts to inherited Functions that - do not return values: ∅ −→ function f_name(param1, ...)... {
↪→ super.f_name(param1, ...); assert(condition);}
- do return values: ∅ −→ function f_name(param1, ...)...{
var (v_<nonce1>,...)= super.f_name(param1, ...);
assert(condition); return (v_<nonce1>, ...); }
A.3 Algorithms
1 if o1 in keccakMap or o2 in keccakMap:
2 keccakMap[simplify(o1 + o2)] = get(keccakMap , o1) + get(keccakMap ,
↪→ o2)
Listing 2: Code added to the ADD-instruction to keep track of expression involved in index and mapping key
computations.
1 for word in input:
2 if word in keccakMap: word = keccakMap[word]
3 if result in keccakMap: keccakMap[result] =
↪→ Concat(keccakMap[result], word)
4 else: keccakMap[result] = word
Listing 3: Code added to the SHA3-instruction to keep track of expression involved in index and mapping key
computations.
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1 check_severity(v, Tc, Tm, max_d , pref_ind):
2 T, τcv := Tc ∪ Tm, ⊥
3 if v.status == VSINGLE:
4 return v, VSINGLE
5 V S := Queue(v)
6 for d in {1.. max_d}: / run until max depth
7 V Snew := Queue(v)
8 while V S != ∅:
9 vs := V S.pop()
10 for τ ∈ T
11 if τcv! =⊥ ∧τ ∈ Tc:
12 continue / skip construction traces
13 if τ.storage.keys ∩ v.storage vars != ∅:
14 vt = τ ◦ vs / apply trace
15 if vt ==⊥:
16 continue / Chain not satisfiable
17 if τ ∈ Tc:
18 zeroize_storage_vars(vt)
19 if not satisfiable(vt.constraints)
20 continue / zeroize and check const. trace
21 if sym_storage_vars(vt.constraint) == ∅:
22 if not pref_ind ∧ τ ∈ Tc:
23 τcv := vt, VCHAIN / save found const. trace
24 else:
25 return vt, VCHAIN / found violating chain
26 else:
27 V Snew.push(vt) / save open state
28 if V Snew == ∅: / trace chain space exhausted
29 if τcv != ⊥:
30 return τcv
31 else:
32 return ⊥, HOLDS
33 else:
34 V S := V Snew
35 if τcv != ⊥: / max depth reached
36 return τcv
37 else:
38 return V S.pop() , VDEPTH
Listing 4: Algorithm to determine the severity level in a violating trace by analyzing the inter-transaction reachability.
Table 2: Uncovered implementation mistakes in ”small” sample with annotation types.
Mistake Uncovering annotation type
Over-/Underflow @invariant
Struct cast to storage @set restricted
Misspelled constructor name @set restricted
Missing visibility modifier @invariant & @set restricted
Memory layout missmatch with delgation @set restricted & @check
Unmatched call forwarded to delegate @set restricted
Unset state (instanciated) @invariant
Unchecked send return @check
Arithmetic mistace (=+) @check
Trick transaction origin @invariant
Unreachable state/code @invariant
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